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This paper initiates the project of mapping the class structure of South Africa at 
the end of the apartheid era.  The theoretical bases of class in the advanced 
industrialised societies of the North are revised to render them more appropriate 
for South African conditions.  This entails emphasising not only the differences 
between employers and employees and those between working people in service 
relationships and those with labour contracts, but also the differences between 
those with formal labour contracts and those who sell their labour on a more 
informal basis.  Data from household surveys is used to construct several 
alternative but crude class categories.  It is shown that there are strong 
correlations between class and income, children’s schooling and aspects of health. 
 Further research is required to demonstrate that class is – or is not – 





Post-apartheid South Africa remains a deeply unequal society.  The economic 
dimensions of this inequality have been explored in considerable detail (see 
especially Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001; Bhorat, Leibbrandt et al., 2001). We 
know who is poor and who is rich.  We also know why people have different 
incomes, in the sense that we know how income is correlated with education, 
access to employment, and the claims that can be made on the state (through 
welfare programmes) or kin (through private remittances of income).  We are 
beginning to understand how and why incomes vary over time, and even how 
inequalities are reproduced across generations.  But we know very little about the 
social dimensions of inequality.  How and why do some people enjoy better health 
and live longer than others? Or have different patterns of marriage, friendship and 
recreation? Or have different social or political attitudes?  Sociologists are yet to 
make a major contribution to the study of contemporary inequalities, even on 
eminently social topics on which economists are working (for example, the 





The study of inequality has been dominated by economists because sociologists 
have been slow to contribute any theoretically-informed and empirically-rich 
analysis of social stratification in post-apartheid South Africa.  Empirical 
analyses of inequality are divided between analyses using easily measured 
individual or household level data (such as educational attainment or 
employment) and descriptive accounts using data for racial groups (either in 
aggregate or as averages).  Yet it is obvious that South African society is 
structured in terms of social groups other than race. Industrialised and semi-
industrialised societies are typically structured in terms of a hierarchy of unequal 
classes.  Is class important in the ‘new’ South Africa?  On this topic, social 
scientists have been largely silent, which is quite remarkable given the strength 
of Marxist scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s.  Sociologists, especially, have 
neither theorised adequately the theory of social stratification in contemporary 
South Africa nor engaged with the mass of data that is (or could readily be) 
available from the explosion of national or other large-scale surveys since 1993 
(see further Seekings, 2001). 
 
Elsewhere we have argued that the basis of social stratification shifted under 
apartheid from race to class: the privileges enjoyed by white South Africans 
were increasingly derived from their class positions and less and less from racial 
discrimination, whilst some black South Africans benefited from upward social 
mobility despite the lingering legacy of racial discrimination (Seekings and 
Nattrass, forthcoming).  Now, in the ‘new’ South Africa, class inequalities are 
highly visible all around us.  The growth of the black elite and ‘middle class’ is 
evident in advertising as in real life.  At the same time, huge numbers of black 
people are confined to an ‘underclass’ of unemployment, poverty and social 
exclusion.  Most white people have retained the advantages conferred by their class 
position at the end of apartheid.  But, at the same time, a small number of white 
people are downwardly mobile.  The use of aggregate data for racial ‘groups’ or 
data on the average for racial ‘groups’ both obscures the social stratification within 
racial ‘groups’ and the extent to which race has ceased to be the key cause of 
inequality.  Indeed, it might be that the emphasis on race, especially in official 
statistics, serves to obscure even the possibility of collecting data on other criteria, 
such as class.  
 
Pointing to the importance of class in South Africa does not mean that people are 
located in the class structure independently of the country’s racialised history.  Nor 
does it mean that there are no cultural or social differences between people with 
different origins, traditions and racial classifications. It is simply to suggest that 
people are rich or poor, enjoy good or bad health, and have at least some attitudes 
that depend primarily on the work they do. Rich (and healthy) households in South 




which they derive an income (in the form of rent or interest or profit). Poor (and 
less healthy) households are poor because the people in them have no or poorly-
paid jobs and do not have the assets that generate an income. Who owns assets and 
who can command high wages for their labour clearly reflects past practices of 
racial discrimination and dispossession. Inequality thus reflects the class structure, 
even if places in the class structure are filled primarily according to the racial 
structure of society in the past. 
 
This working paper initiates the project of mapping the social structure of South 
Africa at the end of the apartheid era. It provides both theoretical foundations for 
and empirical evidence on the class structure.  The data used is primarily from the 
1993 PSLSD survey, conducted by the University of Cape Town together with the 
World Bank; this data has been used widely in analyses of poverty and inequality. 
A large part of this paper is dedicated to the discussion of the methodologies of 
mapping the class structure. Data from household income and expenditure surveys 
(such as the PSLSD survey) are the best available data that we have for South 
Africa, but the fact that these surveys were not designed for the purpose of 
analysing class means that they pose a series of problems. It is important to 
recognise the shortcuts taken, and the assumptions and reasoning that underlie 
these shortcuts. For those readers who are put off by the methodological 
discussion, the key results are set out in Table 11 and Figure 3. 
 
Readers will see that this paper provides several alternative approaches to the task 
of mapping class in South Africa. Tables 7, 10 and 11 set out the results according 
to each of these approaches. The reason for this is that there is no ‘correct’ way of 
mapping the class structure, i.e. there are no ‘correct’ class categories to be used for 
any given society. Defining class categories for any particular society involves 
maintaining a balance between two poles.  On the one hand are the theoretical 
foundations of class.  On the other is the empirical study of the effects or 
consequences of class.  The project of mapping the class structure can be 
conducted using categories pre-determined by one or other theoretical framework. 
This might prove to illuminate the theory, but it seems to us to be nonsensical if we 
accept that real societies differ and our goal is to understand better one particular 
society. As the leading neo-Marxist scholar of class, Eric Ohlin Wright, has 
remarked, any such use of class is simply ‘an arbitrary convention’.  The main 
theoretical approaches to class have developed in part at least through their utility 
to social scientists in understanding the patterns and dynamics of social and 
political life in the advanced capitalist countries. The value of class categories 
depends in part on the correlation between the categories and other variables. In 
other words, the empirical value of class categories lies in part in their use in 
predicting other things – such as inter-generational mobility, lifestyles, attitudes 




To define classes for the South African context we need to reflect on the 
appropriate theoretical bases of class, noting differences between South African 
society and the much-studied societies of the advanced industrialised countries, and 
to take into account evidence on the consequences of class.  In South Africa, we 
have very little idea as to how consequential class is, and thus only a general idea 
as to what versions of class or class categories are most appropriate. As we shall 
see, in some respects South African society is different from society in the 
advanced capitalist countries, and our class analysis should surely take this into 
account. We should not simply and uncritically apply class categories developed in 
different kinds of society. Until we have a fuller understanding of the 
consequentiality of using alternative class categories, however, we should remain 
cognisant of a range of alternatives – including ones not set out here, as the 
alternatives here are far from exhaustive; the diversity offered here might be 
viewed best as merely illustrative. 
 
While recognising the preliminary character of our class analysis, we do favour one 
class schema. This is the scheme summarised in Table 11. It is theoretically 
informed, taking into account economic power in terms of occupation, property 
ownership and business activity. It is informed by theory and has promisingly 
demonstrable empirical consequences (even if both the theoretical and empirical 
bases are still limited). A separate and detailed analysis of the class position of the 
unemployed – in an accompanying working paper (Seekings, 2003) – refines this 
class schema and does not require any substantial revision.  
 
The penultimate section of this paper examines the relationship between our class 
categories and race, and the geographical distribution of the classes. Crucially, we 
show that the relationship between race and class at the end of apartheid was no 
longer a neat one: whilst the poorer classes were overwhelmingly African in 
composition, white people no longer held a monopoly on membership of the richer 
classes. Finally, this paper shows that class (using this class scheme) is significant 
in important respects, in that there is a strong correlation between class and 
household income, living conditions, health and the inter-generational reproduction 
of inequality through the education of children. These correlations exist within 
racial groups as well as within the population as a whole, emphasising the extent to 





2. Theoretical Foundations 
 
Social stratification can be analysed in many different ways. First, societies can be 
analysed in terms of the categories which people themselves use, and the class 
structure can be mapped according to the categories in which people put 
themselves. There do not appear to be any studies on this kind of class imagery in 
South Africa. Second, class can be seen in simple gradational terms, according to 
income (or another material aspect of life). This approach cannot, obviously, help 
us to understand the relationship between class and inequality in the distribution of 
income – since class is defined by relative income. Thirdly, class can be defined in 
terms of the productive assets (for example, land or human capital/education) or 
entitlements (for example, to an old-age pension) ‘owned’ by individuals or 
households.  The fourth way of analysing class is to see class relationally, i.e. in 
terms of the relations between classes.   
 
The most important analyses of class as a relational concept derive from the works 
of the two great German scholars, Karl Marx and Max Weber. For Marxists, class 
is rooted in the patterns of ownership and control that determine relationships 
around production. The ‘two great classes’ of capitalist society are the bourgeoisie 
– who own and control the material means of production – and the proletariat, who 
own only their labour power, and have to work for the bourgeoisie to survive. The 
relationship between these classes is an exploitative one – and this concept of 
exploitation is integral to Marxist class analysis. Weberians, in contrast, focus more 
on the different ‘life chances’ determined in the market by factors such as skills 
and education as well as property. Whereas Marxists focus primarily on 
exploitation and the control of labour effort, Weberians emphasise the differential 
control of ‘market capacities’, and hence income.  Both are concerned with aspects 
of economic power.  For Marxists, economic power is defined in relation to 
production alone.  For Weberians, it is defined also in relation to distribution. 
 
Over time, the differences between Marxist and Weberian scholars of class have 
diminished. Weberians joke that ‘inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a 
Weberian struggling to get out’, whilst neo-Marxists retort that ‘inside every left-
wing Weberian there is a Marxist struggling to stay hidden’ (Wright, 1997: 34-4). 
Weberians are now very much concerned with people’s occupations, i.e. their work 
as well as their market situations, while recent Marxists analyse contemporary 
capitalist society in terms of authority and skills or expertise as well as 
relationships to the means of production.  At the same time, as Westergaard (1995: 
24) has written, the Marxist concern with ‘who does what’ has blended with the 
supposedly Weberian concern with ‘who gets what’.  Marxists have come to see 
capitalism as a system of distribution and not just as one of exploitation. Marxists 




boundaries between classes, i.e. how much mobility is there between classes either 
within someone's lifetime or between generations? What is the relationship 
between class, consciousness and action?  
 
There is now considerable overlap between the empirical categories used by the 
pre-eminent Marxist and Weberian scholars in the world today, namely the 
American Erik Olin Wright and the Briton John Goldthorpe. Wright says of his 
own, neo-Marxist work: 
 
‘The empirical categories themselves can be interpreted in a Weberian 
or hybrid manner. Indeed, as a practical set of operational categories, 
the class structure matrix used in this book does not dramatically differ 
from the class typology used by Goldthorpe ... As is usually the case in 
sociology, the empirical categories of analysis are underdetermined by 
the theoretical frameworks within which they are generated or 
interpreted’ (Wright, 1997: 37). 
 
One important factor driving this process of operational convergence between 
Marxist and Weberians is the need to analyse the growth of non-manual 
occupations. Whereas, at the beginning of the twentieth century most work in the 
advanced industrialised societies was manual, by the end of the century most work 
there was non-manual. Professionals and management are easily separated out, but 
what about employees with some, but limited, skill or authority? Goldthorpe uses a 
seven-class scheme, in the middle of which are three ‘intermediate’ classes: routine 
non-manual, largely clerical, employees in administration and commerce, and 
rank-and-file employees in services; small proprietors and self-employed artisans; 
and lower-grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers; the schema is set 
out in an Appendix to this working paper (see further Goldthorpe, 1997; 
Crompton, 1993: 58-9). Wright, too, is concerned with the ‘problem of the middle 
class among employees’. By distinguishing between occupations according to 
skills and authority, Wright’s expanded typology of class separates out skilled 
supervisors, non-skilled supervisors, experts and skilled workers (Wright, 1997: 
19-26). 
   
Choosing between Alternative Constructions of 
Class 
 
Whilst there might be considerable similarities now between the approaches used 
by neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian analysts, there remain important differences in 
the ways in which approaches are applied.  The construction of class categories in 
practice requires an assessment of the alternative ways of operationalising class 




in Britain on how to revise the official class categories used by the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) in the national census.  In 1994 the Office of National 
Statistics commissioned the Economic and Social Research Council (the British 
equivalent of South Africa’s Human Sciences Research Council) to review and 
recommend revisions to the social classifications used in the British census (Rose 
and O’Reilly, 1997).   
 
The review process began by identifying eight different schemas in use for 
delineating social classifications in Britain (ibid: 1-8): 
 
• The Social Class based on Occupation schema used by the ONS (Registrar-
General).  Originating in the mid-nineteenth century, but fully constructed in 
the early twentieth century, this essentially skill-based classification has been 
used primarily in relation to fertility and mortality.  It has no theoretical basis. 
• The Socio-Economic Groups classification also used by the ONS since 1951.  
Designed by a sociologist, it has also been used in studies of health and 
mortality, but has not been widely used in studies of social stratification or 
mobility. 
• John Goldthorpe’s neo-Weberian social class schema, based on occupations 
(see the Appendix to this working paper). 
• The Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) Social Grade schema.  This 
is widely used in market research, including in defining markets, planning and 
selling advertising, and discriminating across markets and products.  The 
implementation of the schema is thought to be rather erratic, relying on 
interviewer discretion, but the scheme has the advantage over the three schemas 
considered above in that it covers the entire population, rather than just people 
with occupations. 
• Eric Ohlin Wright’s neo-Marxist class schema.  This is said to be ‘theoretically 
rigorous’ but studies in the UK have found it tends ‘to work poorly in empirical 
application’ (ibid: 7). 
• The Hall-Jones occupational scale, developed in 1950, in which occupations 
are graded according to their perceived prestige.  The guidelines used in 
deriving the scale were never published. 
• The Hope-Goldthorpe occupational scale (1974), in which occupations are 
graded according to their social desirability, i.e. their reputation; as such it is a 
measure more of cognitive judgement about the desirability of jobs than it is of 
prestige alone.  The scale relies on popular opinion to define what criteria are 
important in assessing the desirability of a job, and how to weight different 
criteria. 
• The Cambridge Scale, in which occupations are graded according to the 




This scale in effect measures ‘the market outcomes of different jobs and the 
lifestyles associated with them’; it is not a measure of status. 
 
The critical evaluation of alternative schema requires some criteria to be applied.  
Ideally, these criteria should suggest clear ways of validating any particular 
schema.   
 
The first key criterion relates to the theoretical foundations or derivation of a class 
schema.  How explicitly and coherently is the classification or scale related to 
theoretical ideas?  ‘Internal’ or ‘criterion validity’ are the terms used to describe the 
extent to which the measures used in a schema succeed in operationalizing the 
underlying theoretical concept. Any schema is necessarily a proxy for other 
variables that are difficult to measure directly, but are they a good proxy? (see 
further O’Reilly and Rose, 1997).   Wright’s schema is often said to have strong 
theoretical foundations, whilst Goldthorpe’s is said to involve a ‘retreat from 
theory’.  This has been challenged by supporters of Goldthorpe’s schema.  While 
Goldthorpe’s class schema may not be rooted in a theory of society comparable to 
the grandeur of Marxism, it is conceptually well grounded in the distinction 
between employers, employees and the self-employed, and between employment 
relations based on a service relationship and those based on a labour contract 
(Marshall et al., 1997a: 202-4).  Moreover, it has been demonstrated that 
Goldthorpe’s schema displays criterion validity in Britain.  The conceptual 
foundation of the schema should be reflected in variables such as forms of 
remuneration, promotion opportunities and autonomy, especially as regards time.  
Classes defined in terms of Goldthorpe’s schema do indeed display minor intra-
class differences but evident inter-class differences with respect to these kinds of 
variables (see Goldthorpe, 1997: 42-8).   
 
The second key criterion relates to the consequences of class.  Does the schema 
have the capacity to display variation? How well does the classification or scale 
identify and display variation in dependent variables, the relationship of which to 
class or status is of interest?  The satisfaction of this criterion is generally termed 
‘external’ or ‘construct validity’.  The measures relate to other variables of interest 
in ways predicted by the theory.  Wright (1997) reports results for a range of 
countries that suggests that his schema has such construct validity, but Marshall et 
al. (1988; also Marshall, 1997a) found that its performance was greatly inferior to 
Goldthorpe’s schema in Britain.  In Britain at least, the construct validity of 
Goldthorpe’s schema has been well established, in studies ranging from inter-
generational mobility to attitudes and from political behaviour to health. 
 
Ideally, a good schema would satisfy two further criteria (suggested by Goldthorpe, 




does the classification or scale, at the same time as displaying variation, help the 
analyst to see further just how associations or correlations are being brought about? 
 Secondly, is the method of producing the classification explicit and replicable? 
 
The ideal schema (or schemas) would have a clear theoretical basis, would be 
readily replicable, would be demonstrably consequential, and would be amenable 
to analysis linking the theoretical basis with the empirical consequences.  In 
Britain, Goldthorpe’s class schema rules the roost.  It has strong theoretical 
underpinnings, and these have been validated empirically.  The ESRC project 
recommended that the ONS introduce a new interim social classification similar to 
Goldthorpe’s scheme (but extending to cover individuals without occupations).  
The new classification would replace the existing ‘Social Class based on 
Occupation’ and ‘Socio-Economic Group’ schemas (although the new 
classification would allow for the continued application also of the old schemes).  
The classification would be interim pending further research.  The ESRC project 
did report on initial testing of the new schema.  O’Reilly and Rose (1997) find that 
the new classification appears to exhibit criterion validity. It also appears to be 
consequential, i.e. exhibits construct validity, in a range of fields (see Arber, 1997; 
Fitzpatrick et al., 1997). 
 
Constructing Classes in Southern Societies 
 
The problem in countries in the South is both conceptual and operational: how 
should class be conceptualised? How should and can it be measured?  This 
problem is most pronounced in societies that remain, at least in part, agrarian.  The 
last major debate on class in Southern Africa, in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
revolved around the question of how to classify migrant workers who retained a 
foot in agrarian society.  Murray (1981), for example, showed that, for Basotho 
men, a sustained period of wage labour as a migrant worker on South African 
mines was necessary for investment in land as late as the 1970s.  At different points 
of their lives, these men were unambiguously wage workers and struggling 
peasants.  But, as Murray himself showed for Lesotho, growing differentiation and 
landlessness was rapidly eroding the remnants of peasant society.  In South Africa, 
by the early 1990s, smallholder agriculture was of negligible importance (see 
Seekings, 2000; Seekings and Nattrass, forthcoming).   
 
The decline of smallholder agriculture has not sufficed to bring the social structure 
of semi-industrialised southern countries into line with those of the industrialised 
north.  The social structure of countries such as Brazil is distinctively different to 
that of, say, Germany or Britain.  Portes (1985) delineated the class structure in 
Latin America.  At the top, as in northern countries, are small capitalist and 




about 20 percent of the economically active population.  Portes identifies an 
‘informal petty bourgeoisie’.  Finally, there is a huge ‘informal proletariat’ or semi-
proletariat, originally heavily rural (and with one foot in smallholder production) 
but increasingly urban (and involved instead in informal entrepreneurial activity). 
This class comprises as much as two-thirds of the economically active population.  
It is certainly possible to apply class schema that distinguish between, crucially, 
manual, non-manual and agricultural employment.  A series of studies have applied 
versions of Goldthorpe’s schema (e.g. Costa-Ribeiro and Scalon, 2001; for an 
overview, see Aguiar, 2002).  But does the use of such class schema exhibit 
sufficient ‘criterion’ and ‘construct’ validity as in northern countries?  Does 
Goldthorpe’s foundational distinction between service relationships and labour 
contracts mean the same in Brazil’s informal sector as in the more formal 
environment of (say) Britain?  And showing that we can count the numbers of 
individuals in (or moving into and out of) these class categories does not mean that 
these categories ‘count’, in the sense of being consequential. 
 
Analyses of class in southern countries are constrained severely by the limits of 
available data.  Data on occupations is typically collected for only one part of the 
working population, or is collected in ways that are hard to translate into the 
conventional (northern) class schema.  There is rarely any data on what class 
categories mean in the local context.  And there is rarely much data on the 
consequences of class.  All of these constraints hold for South Africa.  In the 
analysis that follows, I begin to explore class in the South African context, but the 
analysis is best seen as exploratory.  As I shall discuss in the concluding comments, 
further and novel research is required to ‘count’ South African classes, to show that 
class counts, and most importantly to count the classes that count. 
 
Occupational Class in South Africa 
 
Given the overwhelming dependence of South African households on wages as a 
source of income (Seekings, 2000; Bhorat, Leibbrandt et al., 2001), occupations 
must be the starting-point for analyses of class in South Africa.  The leading study 
of occupational class in South Africa – by Owen Crankshaw (1997) – employed a 
similar approach to Wright and Goldthorpe, although its ambition was very 
limited. Crankshaw’s study focused on the changing relationship between racial 
and class divisions during the apartheid period. He quantified and analysed the 
pattern of ‘African advancement’ into occupations previously monopolised by 
white people: semi-skilled and skilled employment, white-collar work (especially 
in the service sector), semi-professional occupations (especially teaching and 
nursing), and – to a very limited extent – managerial and professional work. 
Crankshaw sought to identify how the dynamics of capitalist production and 




touched on issues of social mobility and the permeability of class boundaries, but 
he approached these in terms of aggregate occupational categories, not of 
individual or inter-generational mobility.   
 
Crankshaw’s ambition was limited in that, unlike Goldthorpe and Wright, he made 
no attempt to show that – or how – ‘class counts’, i.e. he did not examine the 
consequences of class.  In Crankshaw’s work, class was not analysed as an 
independent variable.  He made little attempt to examine how class (or even the 
racial composition of class categories) was consequential.  To some extent he 
treated class – or rather, the racial composition of occupational class categories – as 
a dependent variable, offering some explanation of changes in the occupational 
class structure and especially the racial composition of occupational class 
categories.  But his concern was primarily to document the changing racial 
composition of occupational class categories, in much the same way as scholars 
elsewhere have examined the changing gender composition of occupational class 
categories.  
 
Crankshaw’s study was based on the government’s Manpower Survey. The 
Manpower Survey collected detailed data on occupation (using about six hundred 
categories) and other aspects of employment. From the mid-1960s, it was 
conducted every year or second year, using a sample of industrial and service 
sector employers (including government institutions). In 1989, the sample 
comprised 12 800 companies (i.e. employers). The questionnaire was sent to 
company managers, and there was a high response rate (with 90 percent 





Table 1.  Crankshaw's occupational classification, 1992 
 
Occupational Category Number Percentage 
Top managers 54 947 1 
Middle managers 201 054 3 
Professionals 179 033 3 
Semi-professionals 706 522 12 
Routine white collar 963 594 17 
Routine policing 267 587 5 
Supervisors 204 566 3 
Artisans/apprentices 298 095 5 
Semi-skilled 1 423 361 24 
Drivers 155 064 3 
Unskilled manual 1 053 999 18 
Unskilled menial 325 691 6 
Total 5 833 513 100 
Source: Table provided by Owen Crankshaw using data from the 1992 Manpower Survey 
 
Crankshaw combined the detailed categories into twelve composite categories, as 
set out in Table 1 (using the 1992 survey data). These figures are estimates, since 
the results from the survey sample are inflated to reflect the total universe of 
employment in South Africa. In an appendix, Crankshaw (1997a: 123-140) lists the 
occupations he has combined into each of these composite categories. The category 
‘top manager’ is limited to managing directors and general managers, and is thus 
very small. ‘Middle manager’ includes middle management, i.e. managers of 
departments within companies or government institutions, managers of shops, 
hotels, mines, and so on. ‘Professionals’ includes occupations such as engineers, 
architects and surveyors, doctors, academics, lawyers and accountants – but 
excludes teachers, nurses, technicians and priests who are all categorised as ‘semi-
professional’. ‘Routine white-collar’ includes occupations such as bank and office 
clerks, cashiers, typists and telephonists, air hostesses, shop assistants, salesmen 
and agents, ticket inspectors, postmen and chefs. ‘Routine policing’ includes the 
military, police and employees in the private security industry. ‘Supervisors’ is 
self-explanatory. ‘Artisans/apprentices’ comprises skilled worker occupations such 
as bricklayers, plumbers, bakers, hairdressers, fitters and turners. ‘Semi-skilled’ 
comprises machine-operators. ‘Drivers’ is also self-explanatory. ‘Unskilled 
manual’ includes labourers, and ‘unskilled menial’ comprises occupations such as 
petrol pump attendants, cleaners, gardeners and waiters – i.e. unskilled jobs that do 
not entail heavy manual work. 
 
These class categories are derived from what Crankshaw calls ‘an eclectic 




dynamics’ (1997: 6).  Crankshaw claims that Goldthorpe’s schema is inadequate 
because ‘it does not provide any basis for understanding how the occupational 
structure is itself reproduced and changed’ (ibid: 5). It therefore needs to be 
combined with elements from labour process theory, which allows for an analysis 
of the process of segmentation (and resegmentation) of the ‘labour market’, or 
rather labour markets.  The logic of this critique of Goldthorpe is not clear, but it is 
of little import in that, as Crankshaw himself emphasises, the ensuing schema is 
not very different from a Goldthorpean one.  His schema apparently takes into 
account the education and training required for different occupations, the authority 
involved, and the salary or wage.  Crankshaw does not explain how, in practice, his 
schema differs from Goldthorpe’s, nor does he demonstrate that it is superior by 
any specified criterion.  Crankshaw was unable to test the internal or criterion 
validity of his class categories.  There was no data, from the Manpower Survey or 
anywhere else, on the detailed character of employment relationships under 
apartheid.  
 
The Manpower Survey did not collect data on some very important occupational 
categories, including farm managers and workers, and domestic workers employed 
by individual households (Crankshaw, 1997a: 8). In South Africa, there were in the 
mid-1990s about one million farmworkers in regular or casual employment, and 
almost as many in domestic work (some of whom will have been included in the 
data above, as they work for companies or government departments rather than 
private households). As a survey of employment, the Manpower Survey also 
excluded the self-employed, whether shopkeeper or hawker, doctor or herbalist.   
 
For Crankshaw’s purposes, the omission of domestic and agricultural work is of 
limited consequence.  These were overwhelmingly dominated by black workers 
through the apartheid period.  Whilst there might have been shifts in the racial 
composition of occupations in these sectors – with, for example, black workers 
moving up into semi-skilled, skilled and supervisory agricultural jobs, and perhaps 
black workers replacing coloured workers in some unskilled jobs – these shifts 
were probably not as substantial as the movement of black workers into semi-
skilled, skilled, white-collar and semi-professional occupations in industry and 
other parts of the service sector.  For our purposes, however, it is necessary to 
reflect further on those occupations excluded from – and those relegated to the 
lowest class categories in – Crankshaw’s schema.  Below I shall argue that the 
employment relationship of workers in what I shall call the ‘marginal working 





Mediated Class Locations 
 
Even if we were to include farm managers and workers, and all domestic workers, 
we would still only have occupational classifications for about eight million 
individuals (as of c.1992). These – together with the very small number of people 
who own factories and farms, and employ other people to work for them – have 
what Wright (1997: 26) terms ‘direct class locations’. Yet South Africa has a 
population of about forty million people. What do we do about the other thirty-two 
million people? These are people who are not involved in employment (either as 
employers or as employees). They include children, ‘housewives’ (or 
homemakers), retired people, people living off their assets, students and the 
unemployed. 
 
Many of these have what Wright (1997: 27) terms ‘mediated class locations’. They 
are the children, spouses or other direct dependants of someone who has a job. The 
reasoning behind this takes us back to the underlying question of what we are 
trying to do by assigning class positions. Wright has this to say: 
 
‘The central point of trying to assign a class location is to clarify the 
nature of the lived experiences and material interests the individual is 
likely to have. Being ‘in’ a class location means that you do certain 
things and certain things happen to you (lived experience) and you face 
certain strategic alternatives for pursuing your material well-being (class 
interests). Jobs embedded within social relations of production are one of 
the ways individuals are linked to such interests and experiences, but not 
the only way. Families provide another set of social relations which tie 
people to the class structure’ (1997: 523-4). 
 
The concept of a ‘mediated class location’ requires that we treat the household as a 
unit of analysis – either as well as, or instead of, the individual. The jobless wife of 
a worker has a mediated class location by virtue of her membership of a household 
that includes a worker. Similarly, different members of a household may work in 
occupations that we would categorise to different classes. Wright prefers to treat 
individuals as having multiple, perhaps contradictory, class locations. This would 
introduce unmanageable complexity into our analysis of the social structure of 
post-apartheid South Africa, and instead we shall allocate a single class position to 
each household (i.e. to each and every member of it). What criteria shall we use to 
do this? The ‘dominance’ approach entails identifying a dominant individual, and 
assigning his or her class position to the other members of the household 
(Runciman, 1990: 382-3).  Goldthorpe controversially advocates categorising the 
entire household according to the position of the breadwinner, who (in the 




(see Marshall et al., 1997b: 106-125; Wright, 1997: 239-317), although Wright 
also concludes from his empirical analysis that the mediated class positions of 
women should be prioritised over their own ‘independent’ positions (Wright, 1997: 
538). What should we do in the case of a lawyer who supports five unskilled, 
unemployed younger relatives. Are they all members of the ‘professional’ class by 
virtue of their breadwinner’s individual class location? 
 
This is, in large part, an empirical issue.  How, in South Africa, does cohabitation 
affect the behaviour and attitudes of dependant members of the household?  There 
is little reason to believe that patterns of influence in a historically patrilineal, 
African society would be the same as in western-style nuclear families.  But many 
African households in South Africa are far removed from the ‘traditionally’ 
dominant types (see the debate on this, including Ziehl, 2001, 2002 and Russell, 
2002).  Unfortunately, there appears to be no data on attitudes and behaviour within 
families or households in South Africa.  In the absence of any data to the contrary, 
it is probably best to assume that the ‘dominance’ approach holds in South Africa 
as elsewhere, but not to assume that adult men are always the dominant individual 
in the household, determining households’ class position. 
 
In South Africa, moreover, about 39 percent of households have nobody in regular 
employment, and about 34 percent have nobody in either casual or regular 
employment. The members of these households do not even have a ‘mediated class 
location’ in the sense used by Wright. These are households that are dependent on 
government old-age pensions, remittances from people who do not live in the 
household (including, most obviously, migrant workers), and (to a very limited 
extent) agricultural production and minor informal sector activity. Some of these 
might be classifiable in terms of past occupation: pensioners and the unemployed 
might be classified in terms of the last job they had. Households dependent on 
remittances might be classified in terms of the occupational position of the person 
remitting money to them. But some cannot be classified even indirectly in 
occupational terms. Should we use the concept of an ‘underclass’ of long-term 
unemployed – as has been suggested, and assessed, in the advanced capitalist 
societies where unemployment rates are much lower (Marshall et al., 1997c: 86-
105; Wright, 1997: 28-9)? 
 
In summary, if we wish to map the social structure of South Africa as a whole, we 
have to confront three related, intractable methodological problems: (1) Are 
households or individuals the appropriate unit of analysis? (2) How should we 
relate the social class position of jobless individuals in households to the 
occupational classification of those household members who have jobs? And (3) 
how should we identify the social class position of individuals in households where 




identify a further problem: (4) how do we allocate a class position to an individual 
or household who or which combines an occupation with income from property or 
business activities? There are no uniquely ‘right’ answers to these questions; our 
answers are dependent on our assumptions (which may well be rooted in ideology). 




3. Mapping Class: An Occupation-Based 
Analysis 
 
The easiest place to start is to analyse households in terms of the occupations of 
working members. The PSLSD survey collected details of the kind of occupation, 
kind of employer and economic sector of every member of each household with 
either regular or casual employment. This data can be used to assign a crude or 
approximate class position to each and every employed individual. The class 
categories of workers in each household can then be used to allocate a class 
location to each household – and every member of it. 
 
Classifying Individuals' Occupations 
 
The PSLSD survey divided occupations into eleven categories. The representative 
sample of 8 848 households in the survey included a total of 7 515 workers in 
regular employment, and 945 workers with casual employment. The distribution of 
workers in regular and casual employment between these occupational categories 













01 Professional, semi-professional and 
technical 
14,5 4,8 
02 Managerial, executive and administrative 6,4 1,5 
03 Clerical and sales 14,7 12,6 
04 Transport, delivery and communications 5,3 3,2 
05 Service 14,9 19,2 
06 Farming and related occupations 4,3 4,2 
07 Artisan, apprentices and related 
occupations 
7,0 9,2 
08 Production foremen and supervisors 3,2 1,2 
09 Operators, production workers and related 
semi-skilled occupations 
9,7 4,6 
10 Labourers 19,9 38,3 
11 Other 0,2 1,1 
 Total 100 100 
 
These categories are both too detailed and too broad for our purposes. Ideally, we 
would be able to reclassify them into categories similar to those suggested by 
Goldthorpe or Crankshaw.  Unfortunately, there is insufficient detail in the PSLSD 
survey to do this.  We are forced to identify broader class categories that are, we 
hope, reasonable proxies for a more finely-tuned schema.  We reorganise these into 
the following five class categories: 
 
• upper class (UC): managers and professionals; 
• semi-professional class (SPC): teachers and nurses; 
• intermediate class (IC): routine white-collar, skilled and supervisory; 
• core working class (CWC): semi-skilled and unskilled workers (except 
farm- and domestic workers); 
• marginal working class (MWC): farm- and domestic workers. 
 
Does this five-class schema have any theoretical basis?  The basis of this schema 
is, like for Goldthorpe and Crankshaw, the nature of the employment relationship.  
Each category, it is hoped, combines occup-ations with similar economic power in 
the sense that they have broadly similar employment relationships, i.e. in terms of 
economic security, career prospects and autonomy (see Marshall et al., 1997a: 22-
24, 202-3).  The upper and semi-professional classes in our schema correspond 
theoretically to Goldthorpe’s classes (I and II) in which the employment 
relationship is a service relationship, characterised by the prospect of incremental 




and a high degree of autonomy.  (The Goldthorpe class schema is set out in an 
Appendix at the end of this paper).  Semi-professional occupations are 
distinguished from professional occupations, as Crankshaw recommends, because 
the qualification required is lower (usually a diploma rather than a degree), there 
are limited prospects for upward occupational mobility, and they lack authority in 
the workplace (Crankshaw, 1997a: 9-10). The core and marginal working classes 
correspond theoretically to Goldthorpe’s classes VIIa and VIIb, in which the 
employment relationship is based on a labour contract, where labour is provided 
under close supervision and a closely-regulated payment system.  Our intermediate 
class encompasses Goldthorpe’s classes III and V, in which the employment 
relationship combines elements of the service relationship and the labour contract.  
Thus the five classes in our proposed class schema are intended to distinguish 
between occupations based on service relationships and those based on labour 
contracts. 
 
There are two important respects, however, in which our proposed class schema 
here differs from Goldthorpe’s.  Firstly, we have also included in the intermediate 
class skilled manual workers (Goldthorpe’s class VI).  This is based on the 
supposition that, in the South African context, skilled manual workers often enjoy 
a degree of economic power comparable to supervisory and routine non-manual 
employees, largely because of the high capital intensity of South African industry.  
Secondly, we suggest that there is a key distinction between the core and marginal 
working classes, based on the nature of the labour contract.  In the South African 
context, as in Brazil, a large number of workers sell their labour for wages without 
any formal contract: their conditions of work are quite distinctive and they are 
especially vulnerable to employers.  These clearly include many farm and domestic 
workers, and arguably also growing numbers of other workers (see further below). 
 In addition, we have at this stage not accommodated the self-employed, who fall 
into Goldthorpe’s classes IVa, IVb and IVc; we shall address this issue later. 
 
Fitting these categories to the PSLSD data is a crude exercise because the data does 
not include detailed descriptions of occupations but rather coded variables. Table 2 
sets out the occupational codes used in the PSLSD data. In our schema, the upper 
class (UC) is defined as comprising occupational codes 01 and 02, excepting those 
categorised as semi-professionals. The semi-professional class (SPC) comprises 
occupational codes 01 and 02 if employed by the state and in the educational sector 
(for teachers) or the health sector, if schooling is less than a degree (for nurses). 
The intermediate class (IC) is composed of occupational codes 03, 04, 07 and 08. 
The core working class (CWC) comprises occupational codes 05, 06, 09 and 10, 
excepting those employed in the agriculture/fishing/forestry sector or the domestic 
services sector. The marginal working class (MWC) comprises occupational codes 




domestic services sector. Two of the PSLSD occupational categories are difficult to 
allocate: (04) Transport, delivery and communications occupations, and (05) 
Service occupations. Both probably include some workers who should be defined 
as intermediate and others who are more appropriately considered as working. 
Crankshaw has similar problems with his categories of ‘drivers’ and ‘routine 
policing’, which encompass variously skilled occupations. The categorisation 
above is open to many criticisms: cleaners employed by firms are probably 
included in the marginal working class (MWC) rather than the core working class 
(CWC), unskilled night-watchmen or security guards in the intermediate class (IC) 
rather than core working class (CWC), and so on.  The categories must be viewed 
as crude. 
 
Ideally, we would examine the internal or criterion validity of this schema.  Do 
these five class categories in fact combine economic roles with similar degrees of 
economic power in the workplace?  The PSLSD data does not allow us to do this, 
but a more recent data-set could be used for this purpose.  The Labour Force 
Surveys (LFSs) conducted since 2000 by the official statistics agency, Statistics 
South Africa, collect much more detailed data on work, including both occupations 
and self-employment.  The data for employees covers the permanency of 
employment, the ownership of tools used, whether the contract is written or not, 
whether the work is supervised and whether payments are made to pension or 
retirement funds.  Use of this data would allow both the testing of the internal 
validity of the crude PSLSD-based class categories (assuming that these could be 
recreated from the LFS data) and, if necessary, the development of more finely-
tuned class categories.  Further research is clearly warranted using the LFS data.  
Unfortunately, however, the LFSs collect little data other than on work, so they are 
of little value in examining whether class ‘counts’, i.e. has external or construct 
validity.   
 
Table 3.  PSLSD-based, reduced occupational categories 
 
Occupational classification Percent 
UC: Upper class 11 
SPC: Semi-professional class 7 
IC: Intermediate class 29 
CWC: Core working class 31 
MWC: Marginal working class 21 
Total 100 
 
Using these categories, we allocate an individual occupational classification to 
every individual in regular or casual employment in the PSLSD survey. A small 




classifications. For example, the PSLSD sample includes the case of a young 
woman living in Pretoria, who has a full-time job working for the government in a 
professional occupation but also works as a sports instructress for one hour a day. 
In cases like this the individual was classified according to the ‘highest’ class for 
which their jobs make them ‘eligible’.  The distribution of working people in the 
PSLSD survey between these categories is presented in Table 3. 
 
Excluding workers in agriculture and domestic services allows us to compare the 
PSLSD data with Crankshaw’s data. There remain important differences: most 
obviously between occupational classifications, but also in that Crankshaw 
includes some domestic workers (if they are employed by companies rather than 
private households). The comparison is presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  PSLSD-based and Crankshaw’s occupational categories 
compared 
 
Classification Crankshaw (%) PSLSD Total employment (%) 
Upper class 7 14 
Semi-professional class 12 9 
Intermediate class 33 37 
Working class 48 40* 
Total 100 100 
* The MWC is excluded from the PSLSD data in this table.  
 
It is difficult to judge the significance of the differences in the Crankshaw and 
PSLSD data recorded in Table 4. The PSLSD classifies a higher proportion of 
employed individuals as upper class, a smaller proportion as semi-professional, a 
slightly higher proportion as intermediate, and fewer people as working class (i.e. 
core working class). Part of the last of these differences is presumably due to the 
inclusion in Crankshaw’s data of workers in the domestic sector who are employed 
by firms (as opposed to private households) – i.e. people excluded from the PSLSD 
(core) working class category in Table 4. Crankshaw’s occupational categories are, 
of course, constructed with greater care than the PSLSD – but categorisation is 
only as good as the data and, especially, the sample used. 
 
Before we can turn to the problem of moving from individual occupational 
classifications to household class classifications, we have to make sure that each 
individual has only one individual occupational classification. For the small 
number of people with two or more jobs, the highest classification of any of the 
jobs is taken as the overall individual classification. Thus, an office worker 
(intermediate class) who has a part-time job as a teacher (semi-professional class) 




works part-time as a construction worker on a road-building project would be 
classified as core working-class. In a very small number of cases, the overall 
classification is counter-intuitive, but these are too few to make any significant 
difference to the overall results. 
This last example raises questions about our delineation between core and marginal 
working class. Trade unions and social scientists alike have increasingly 
emphasised the growing distinctions between sections of the labour force 
according to the degree of protection provided by labour legislation and the 
opportunities for collective organisation through trade unions.  The working class 
is said to be undergoing ‘resegmentation’ (Kenny & Webster, 1998). The more 
marginal sections of the working class include not only farm and domestic 
workers, but also many casual workers as well as employees in some small firms, 
especially in sectors such as construction. Optimally, we would use a more 
nuanced set of criteria for distinguishing between the core and marginal working 
class categories (CWC and MWC). These criteria might include other measures of 
precariousness in the labour market, such as some forms of casual employment. 
Separating out farm- and domestic workers only is a manageable, rather than the 
optimal, way of drawing distinctions. 
 
Classifying Households in Terms of Individual 
Occupational Classifications 
 
Having given every individual in employment an occupational classification, we 
can begin to categorise the households of which they are members. The 
methodology for classification involves three stages. Firstly, households with only 
one person in regular or casual employment are classified according to the 
individual class position of that person. Thus, a household that includes a lawyer is 
classified as upper class, and one that includes a construction worker as working 
class. A total of 3704 households – out of a total of 8 848 in the sample, 
comprising 42 percent – were in this position. Secondly, households with more 
than one person in regular or casual employment, but where all of the working 
people have the same individual class position, are classified according to that 
uniform position. A total of 979 households, or 11 percent of the sample, were in 
this position. Some of these households had as many as six members with the same 
individual occupational classification. Finally, the remaining households – which 
had more than one working member each, but where the working members had 
different individual occupational classifications – were classified according to the 
highest individual occupational classification of their members. Thus a household  
composed of a domestic worker and a semi-skilled factory worker was classified as 
core working class, and one that comprised the managing director of a firm (upper 
class) and a secretary (intermediate) was classified as upper class. A total of 13 




The actual figures for the classification of households in the PSLSD sample during 
each of these three stages are presented in Table 5 below. Disproportionately, many 
of the households categorised in the first two stages are in the lower class 
categories; disproportionately, many of the cross-class households are in the higher 
class categories. 
 













Total in each 
class as % of 
total sample 




232 71 158 461 5 
Intermediate 
class 
1 014 262 449 1 725 20 
Core working 
class 
1 325 263 165 1 753 20 
Marginal 
working class 
822 250 0 1 072 12 
Total (in five 
classes) 
3 704 979 1 119 5 802 67 
 
The methodology used here reduces cross-class households (in terms of 
employment) to a single household classification. The range of individual 
membership of cross-class households according to individual occupational 
classification is indicated in Table 6. In this table, each row shows the occupational 
classifications of the individuals in households, with the household classification 





Table  6.  Household and individual classifications compared 
Individual occupational classification Household class 
UC SPC IC CWC MWC 
Total 
UC 942 74 246 87 11 1 360
SPC 0 540 108 69 13 730
IC 0 0 2 093 378 184 2 655
CWC 0 0 0 2 087 191 2 278
MWC 0 0 0 0 1 390 1 390
Total 942 614 2 447 2 621 1 789 8 413
 
Table 6 shows, for example, that households classified as upper class included 942 
people with upper class individual occupational classifications, 74 with semi-
professional individual occupational classifications, 246 with intermediate 
individual occupational classifications, and so on. Most cross-class households 
span a narrow range of individual occupational classifications: especially upper 
class and intermediate class, and intermediate class and core working class. There 
are very few surprising combinations (such as upper class and marginal working 
class). 
 
Another shortcut in the methodology needs to be acknowledged. In allocating a 
class position to individuals and households, no distinction is made between 
permanent and casual employment. Thus, an individual with both a permanent and 
a casual job is categorised according to the ‘higher’ classification of either job. 
More importantly, a multi-class household is categorised according to the ‘higher’ 
classification of any of its members, even if that member has a casual job only 
whilst other members, in ‘lower’ class categories, have permanent jobs. Whilst this 
shortcut is unlikely to make much difference, a more nuanced class categorisation 
might make allowance for such multi-class positions. 
 
Classifying Households without Any Members in 
Employment 
 
The classification of households in terms of the occupations of their members 
leaves 33 percent of households unclassified – and unclassifiable according to 
straightforward occupational categories. The next step is therefore to classify these 
households without working members. Unfortunately, there is no obviously correct 
way of doing this. Below we shall use three different methodologies for classifying 
these remaining households: (1) according to whether or not they include 
unemployed people or not, (2) according to whether or not they receive income 
from assets or entrepreneurial activity, and (3) according to whether or not they 





Let us consider first the presence of unemployed people. Here we shall use an 
expanded definition of unemployment. Whereas a narrow definition of 
unemployment includes only those jobless people who are actively looking for 
work, the expanded definition also includes the ‘discouraged’ unemployed, i.e. 
jobless people who are not actively looking for work because, they say, there are 
no jobs available (see further Nattrass, 2000). On this basis, the unclassified 
households can be divided between households with unemployed members, 
labelled the ‘NESU’ or ‘no employed/some unemployed class’, and those without, 
labelled ‘other’. The residual ‘other’ class comprises households without any wage 
earners or unemployed people, but includes households with only self-employed 
people or people who do not participate in the labour force (such as full-time 
students, pensioners, people looking after children and the home, and the disabled 
or sick). The NESU class includes almost 15 percent of the households in the 
PSLSD sample, whilst the other class includes almost 19 percent of them. 
 
Household Classifications and Household Incomes 
 
Having classified every household, we can now turn to see how the class structure 
is reflected in material terms, and how it fits into the picture of income distribution. 
Table 7 shows the mean household income of households in each of the seven 
classes we have identified, together with the proportion of households in that class 
and the share of total income earned by that class as a whole. There is very clearly 
a relationship between class (as we have defined it) and household income. 
Mean household incomes in the top class are more than eight times the mean 
household income in the marginal working class, and thirteen times the mean 
household income of the unemployed class. Put another way, the upper class 
comprises 9 percent of the households, but 30 percent of the total income, 
whereas the marginal working class comprises 12 percent of the households but 
only 5 percent of total income. Households in the NESU class (i.e. households 
with no employed but some unemployed members) comprise 15 percent of the 
total sample, but just 4 percent of total household income. 
 
Part of this difference is due to the different number of household members in 
employment. Only 39 percent of upper class households had just one member in 
employment; the equivalent proportion for intermediate class households was 59 
percent, for core working class households 76 percent, and marginal working class 
households 77 percent. The effects of higher individual incomes are thus 
compounded as upper class households have multiple incomes from employment. 
The average upper class household had 1,3 times as many members in employment 
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UC 6 573 5 542 9 30 3,7 
SPC 3 601 2 838 5 10 5,0 
IC 2 493 1 748 20 25 4,5 
CWC 1 335 1 057 20 14 4,6 
MWC 795 532 12 5 4,3 
NESU  513 367 15 4 5,8 
Other 1 366 450 19 13 4,1 
Total 1 957 907 100 100 4,6 
 
There is not much of a relationship between class and household size. The upper 
class has the smallest average household size, at 3,7 members. The NESU class has 
the highest average, at 5,8 members. The averages for the other classes all fall in 
between, in no apparent order. The core and marginal working classes have an 
average household size of 4,6 and 4,3 members respectively (although both are 
pulled down by the inclusion of single-member ‘households’ comprising migrant 
workers living in hostels). The semi-professional class has an average household 
size above the overall mean, and the intermediate class an average household size 
just below the mean. The small size of upper class households and the large size of 
NESU households mean that the average per capita household incomes of the 
different classes vary by more than the average household income. 
 
A striking feature of Table 7 is the high average income of households remaining 
in the ‘other’ category. These households include some very rich households, with 
high incomes from self-employment, financial assets, rent or agricultural 
production – as we shall see further below. The class also includes very poor 
households, dependent on pensions or remittances or without any income 
whatsoever. It is clearly a problem to combine these disparate households into one 
category. It is revealing that the median household income in this residual category 
is very low, barely more than the NESU class, despite the high mean household 
income. This shows that there are many very poor households and a few very rich 
households in this category. 
If we compare the average household incomes above with the overall mean 
(average) and median, we can see several interesting results. The mean household 




household income was just over R900 per month. (These are in 1993 prices; 
between 1993 and 2003 prices doubled, so that the 1993 mean and median 
household incomes in 2003 prices would be approximately R4000 and R1800 per 
month).  The average income of households in the upper class, semi-professional 
class and intermediate classes are above both the mean and median incomes for 
society as a whole. The average income for households in the core working class is 
below the mean but above the median. Only in the marginal working class and the 
NESU class is the average household income below the median as well as the 
mean. Households in the core working class are not privileged, in that they have 
average incomes below the mean for society as a whole, but are privileged in that 
their incomes are nonetheless above the median.  
 
Mapping the Social Structure 
 
Using Table 7 we can draw two ‘maps’ of the social structure, one separating out 
the classes according to their share of the total number of households and the other 
according to their share of the total income.  The pyramid shape of the first map in 
Figure 1 contrasts visually with the upturned pyramid of the second map. Figure 1 
illustrates the point that the largest classes in post-apartheid South Africa – defined 
according to the methodology used here, using the PSLSD data, and measuring 
size in terms of numbers of households – are the intermediate class, the core 
working class and the residual, ‘other’ category. There are also substantial numbers 
of households in the NESU and marginal working classes. But the income shares 
of these classes are very different to the distribution of households. The largest 
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The results shown in Table 7 can be also be used to map the social structure in 
terms of how classes related to patterns of income distribution. Tables 8 and 9 
show the relationship between class and income deciles (each decile comprising 
one-tenth of the total number of households, ordered according to household 
income). Table 8 shows how each class is distributed in terms of income deciles, 
whilst Table 9 shows the composition of each income decile in terms of classes. 
 
Table 8.  Class, by income decile 
 

















1 0 0 1 2 10 32 19 10 
2 0 0 2 4 19 20 19 10 
3 0 0 3 7 18 16 18 10 
4 1 0 5 13 17 12 13 10 
5 1 1 7 15 17 8 11 10 
6 2 4 13 19 11 7 6 10 
7 5 13 17 18 5 3 4 10 
8 7 24 21 14 2 2 4 10 
9 25 34 19 7 1 1 3 10 
10 59 24 12 2 0 0 4 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The upper class is concentrated in the top two deciles, with over half (59 percent) 
of its members in the top decile alone. Almost all (82 percent) semi-professional 
households are in the top three deciles. Intermediate class households are more 
evenly distributed, but with most in deciles 7 to 9. The working class is spread out 
between deciles 4 and 8, with the largest proportions in deciles 6 and 7. Most (or 





Table 9.  Income decile, by class 
 
Income decile House-
hold class 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
Total 
% 
UC 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 7 22 52 9 
SPC 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 12 18 12 5 
IC 1 4 5 10 14 25 34 42 38 24 20 
CWC 3 7 14 26 30 37 36 28 15 4 20 
MWC 13 23 23 21 21 13 6 2 1 1 12 
NESU 47 30 24 18 13 10 4 3 1 1 15 
Other 36 36 34 5 21 11 9 7 6 8 19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The bottom three deciles consist mostly of households without any employed 
members; the only employed members are generally in farm or domestic work (i.e. 
are in the marginal working class). The core working class constitute between 25 
percent and 37 percent of each of deciles 4 to 8. Deciles 7 to 9 are dominated by 
intermediate class households, and decile 10 by upper class households. 
 
We can now map the social structure according to income deciles. Figure 2 shows 
that the social structure does not map onto income categories as clear strata, but 
rather that there is some ‘overlap’ between classes. Some intermediate class 
households have higher incomes than some upper class households, many core 
working class households have higher incomes than some intermediate class 
households, and so on. But these maps do show some pattern. The upper class and 
semi-professional households are, in income terms, the most advantaged classes in 
society. Intermediate class households are, in general, located below them in 
income terms, and core working class households are, in general, lower still. None 
of these classes, however, includes very many households in the poorer half of the 
population. The poorer half of the population comprises households in the marginal 





Figure 2. Distribution of Classes across Income Deciles 
 
          Decile 10 (richest) 
          Decile 9 
          Decile 8 
          Decile 7 
          Decile 6 
          Decile 5 
          Decile 4 
          Decile 3 
          Decile 2 




 upper class 
 semi-professional class 
 intermediate class 
 core working class 
 marginal working class 
 NESU class 
 other 
Note: Each square corresponds to one percent of society, with each row (or income 
decile) comprising ten squares.  Thus the upper class comprises approximately half (5/10) 
of the top decile, one-fifth (2/10) of decile 9 and 1/10 of decile 8, making  total of about 8 




A Second Way of Classifying Households without 
Members in Employment 
 
Classifying households without members in employment according to whether 
they include unemployed people (as opposed to just jobless people who are not 
available for employment and thus not in the economically active population, i.e. 
children, retired people, etc) overlooks the role of remittances in society. A 




financially by other households through remittances. Households that are 
dependent on remittances might be thought of as part of the same classes as the 
households that send money to them. 
 
The PSLSD survey provides data on which households receive remittances and 
which households send them, but there is no way of matching one up with the 
other. What we can do is identify which households in the NESU or ‘other’ 
categories above receive remittances, and define them as a separate class. Given, 
however, that the PSLSD data shows that almost 60 percent of total remittances are 
sent by households classified as core working class or intermediate class, we can 
probably assume that most households that receive remittances and are thus in this 
newly-identified class, receive them from the intermediate and core working 
classes. (The PSLSD evidence on remittances is examined further in the 
accompanying working paper (Seekings, 2003), with respect to whether the 
unemployed comprise an ‘underclass’ in South Africa). 
 
A second factor which we might want to take into account is that many households 
are dependent on the old-age pension received by men (over the age of sixty-five) 
and women (over the age of sixty). Most retired people in the 1990s spent most of 
their lives working – i.e. they spent most of their lives in an era when 
unemployment was low. We might think of pensioners as retired members of the 
occupational classes identified above. Unfortunately, we have no way of telling 
what occupations pensioners were in prior to their retirement. We can be confident 
that they were not in the upper class or semi-professional grouping, since they 
would then probably have access to private pension schemes and be ineligible for 
the government old-age pension. It is also unlikely that many were in intermediate 
occupations, since the intermediate class has grown relatively recently, and 
generally required qualifications that most old people did not have. It is therefore 
likely that most pensioners are former members of the core or marginal working 
classes (or were the dependants of people who were in those classes). 
 
Taking these factors into account, we can reclassify the unemployed and ‘other’ 
households above into four different categories: households receiving remittances, 
households receiving old-age pensions, households receiving both remittances and 
old-age pensions, and households receiving neither remittances nor old-age 
pensions. Table 10 provides data on the size, incomes and income shares of the 
classes defined using these classifications. Among the households without any 
employed members, the mean and median incomes of households that receive 
pensions but not remittances are higher than the incomes of those that receive 





The final column gives the average household size for each class, including 
resident household members. The PSLSD survey also asked about non-resident 
‘members’ of the household, most of whom were migrant workers. If these non-
residents are included, then the average household size of the first five classes 
changes little. The average size of the class that has no employed members but 
receives remittances rises from 4,7 to 5,9, whilst the average size of the class that 
has no employed members but receives remittances and pensions rises from 5,7 to 
7,1. These figures show the importance of migrant workers, remitting part of their 
wages, to such households.  
 
In Table 10 it is striking that the mean household income in the residual ‘other’ 
category is high (above the mean for society as a whole). This is because this 
residual category includes two very different kinds of household: those with almost 
no income whatsoever (34 percent of the households in this category are in the 
bottom income decile), and households with income from self-employment, rent, 
financial assets and so on (which result in about 20 percent of the households in 
this category falling into the top four income deciles). The incomes of households 
receiving remittances and pensions are much lower, as we would expect. 
 











in class as a 




class as a % of 





UC 6 573 5 542 9 30 3,7 
SPC 3 601 2 838 5 10 5,0 
IC 2 493 1 748 20 25 4,7 
CWC 1 335 1 057 20 14 4,6 
MWC 795 532 12 5 4,3 
No employed, but receiving: 
Remittances 464 258 12 3 4,7 
Pensions 682 480 8 3 4,9 
Remittances 
& pensions 
757 633 6 2 5,7 
Other*  2342 300 8 9 4,2 
Total 1 957 907 100 100 4,6 
*Other includes households with neither (a) any employed members nor (b) any 





3. Mapping Class: Property and Business 
 
The implementation of this approach has entailed a series of methodological 
shortcuts and theoretical assumptions that warrant critical comment. Some of these 
reflect the limits of the dataset: for example, it was not possible to separate out 
domestic workers employed by private households (who should be in the marginal 
working class) from cleaning staff employed by firms, government departments, 
universities, schools and so on (who should be included in the core working class). 
Others concern the procedures used for classifying households. Most importantly, 
all members of a cross-class household were classified as being in the same class, 
since the household was used as the unit of analysis; and each household was 
classified according to the ‘highest’ individual occupational classification of any of 
its members – regardless of whether that person was in regular or casual 
employment, the primary breadwinner or not, or the head of the household or not. 
No account was taken of distribution within the household: we know in practice 
that income is often not shared equally in a household and, in socio-political terms, 
a dependant, unemployed or otherwise jobless person is rarely in a position equal 
to that of the household’s primary breadwinner. There are many sociological issues 
which we might want to explore for which we would need to disaggregate the 
household – in terms of sex, age, employment, or whatever. 
 
Another set of concerns is related to the privileging of employment in this 
approach. No account has been taken of self-employment or activities other than 
employment, nor has any account been taken of the significance in monetary terms 
of employment relative to other sources. While we know that household incomes 
in South Africa are dominated by wages and wage-related income – which 
constitute a total of about 68 percent of the total income in the country – there may 
be a significant number of households with members in employment whose 
household income comes not from wages primarily, but from other sources. For 
example, a rich household might receive more ‘unearned’ income (i.e. from 
financial investments, rents, profits) than income from salaries or wages, and a 
poor household might receive more from government old-age pensions than from 
the casual or even regular employment of its members. There is no unique, right 
way of classifying households and mapping the social structure, so we should 
consider what differences would result if we used different approaches. 
 
Let us consider those households that earn income from wealth or from 
entrepreneurial activity. Such households include small and large businessmen, 
land and property owners, farmers, and owners of financial assets that generate a 
return. As many as 45 percent of South African households earn some income from 
these activities. Optimally, we would classify these by some criteria independent of 




themselves work – but this is impossible with the data from the PSLSD survey. 
What we can do is categorise households according to the level of income earned 
from wealth or entrepreneurship, guessing that income is a crude proxy for the 
preferred criteria. To be more explicit, we might guess that the high income 
entrepreneurs or property-owners tend to employ other people, but do not work 
fully themselves, whilst middle income entrepreneurs or property-owners tend to 
employ others and work themselves, whilst the low-income entrepreneurs tend to 
work themselves, but not employ anyone else.  
 
The PSLSD data indicates that over half of the households with income from 
entrepreneurship or wealth – or 26 percent of all households – earn less than the 
value of an old-age pension from these activities. This sum is tiny, and is too small 
to warrant any modification of the classificatory scheme; thus, for example, 
households classified as core working class by occupation would remain classified 
as such, whilst hitherto unclassified households would remain unclassified. One 
quarter of the households with some income from assets or entrepreneurship 
(comprising 11 percent of all households) earn more than the value of a pension, 
but less than five times the value of a pension. As this represents significant (even 
if not massive) earnings, the household classification must take it into account. The 
choice of five times the value of a pension is not entirely arbitrary, as it 
corresponds almost exactly to the mean household income in South Africa. A small 
number of households – 7 percent of the total in South Africa – earn more than five 
times the value of a pension from wealth or entrepreneurial activity. Over half of 
these earn more than ten times the value of a pension, i.e. over R3 900 per month in 
1993, which is a very substantial amount. 
 
The household classification is modified, taking these earnings into account, as 
follows: all households (excepting those in the upper class already) with earnings 
from wealth and entrepreneurial activity higher than ten times the value of an old-
pension are classified as ‘WE1’ (where WE stands for wealth/entrepreneurship). 
Households (excepting those in the upper class already) with earnings from these 
sources more than five times but less than ten times the value of a pension are 
classified as ‘WE2’. Households in the core and marginal working classes and the 
unclassified categories which have earnings above the value of a pension – but less 
than the five times this value – are classified as ‘WE3’. Of the households 
reclassified according to wealth and entrepreneurial activity, almost two-thirds 
come from the previously unclassified residual category, with about one-sixth from 
the semi-professional and intermediate classes (to WE1 and WE2) and one-sixth 
from the core and marginal working classes (mostly to WE3). 
 
The above classification of households is based on two criteria: the occupation of 




wealth or entrepreneurial activity. The residual, unclassified category therefore 
consists of households with no members in employment and negligible earnings 
from wealth or entrepreneurship. Most of these households are dependent on 
remittances or old-age pensions. This residual category could be divided according 
to whether or not the households included unemployed members or not, or 
according to the sources of household income. For simplicity, they are simply left 
as an undifferentiated ‘other’ category in the tables that follow. In the 
accompanying working paper (Seekings, 2003), we disaggregate this category 
further. 
 
The distribution of households between these nine classifications, based on 
occupation, wealth and entrepreneurship, is set out in Table 11. This approach 
allows us to see that important differences existed between the three ‘WE’ classes. 
Mean incomes among WE1 households are ten times the mean incomes of WE3 
households. Put another way, the mean incomes of households in the WE1 and 
WE2 classes were above both the mean and median incomes for society as a 
whole, whilst the mean household income in the WE3 class was below the mean 
but above the median. These differences were even bigger if one takes household 
size into account, as the WE1 and WE2 classes were smaller than average, while 
the WE3 households were larger than average.   
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class as a % of 





WE1 15 732 8 520 1 11 4,5 
UC 6 573 5 542 9 30 3,8 
WE2 4 665 3 755 2 4 4,1 
SPC 3 264 2 735 5 8 5,3 
IC 2 257 1 700 19 22 4,7 
WE3 1 442 1 115 5 4 5,7 
CWC 1 187 1 008 19 11 4,7 
MWC 618 518 12 4 4,5 
Other 413 363 29 6 5,8 
Total 1 957 907 100 100 5,0 
 
If society is looked at in this way, then there is a clearer relationship between class 
and household income. Mean household incomes in the WE1 class were twenty-




nearly forty times the mean household income of the residual ‘other’ class. The two 
top classes between them comprised 10 percent of the households, but 41 percent 
of the total income, whereas the bottom two classes comprised 41 percent of all 
households but only 10 percent of total income.  Figure 3 ‘maps’ the class structure 
of South Africa using this schema, grouping classes together to illustrate the 
essentially three-part character of the class structure. 
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Upper class   12      45
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Marginal working  ) 
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Table 12.   Class, by income decile, for third classificatory system 
 

















1 0 0 1 0 2 11 29 10 
2 0 0 2 0 4 19 23 10 
3 0 0 3 11 8 19 18 10 
4 0 0 5 10 14 17 13 10 
5 0 1 8 18 16 17 9 10 
6 1 5 13 17 20 11 5 10 
7 4 13 18 18 19 4 2 10 
8 9 25 22 14 15 1 1 10 
9 26 35 19 10 5 1 0 10 
10 59 20 9 3 1 0 0 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The results shown in Table 11 can be also be used to map the social structure in 
terms of the relationships between classes and the distribution of income, just as we 
have already used the results shown in Table 7. Tables 12 and 13 show the 
relationship between class and household income deciles. Table 12 shows how 
each class is distributed in terms of income deciles, whilst Table 13 shows the 
composition of each income decile in terms of classes. For simplification, WE1 
and WE2 are combined with the occupationally-defined upper class (UC). These 
elite classes are concentrated in the top two deciles, with over half (59 percent) of 
their members in the top decile alone. Almost all (80 percent) semi-professional 
households are in the top three deciles. Intermediate class households are more 
evenly distributed, but with most (60 percent) in deciles 7 to 9. The core working 
class is spread out between deciles 4 and 8, with the largest proportions in deciles 6 
and 7. Most (72 percent) marginal working class households are in deciles 2 to 5. 
Only the marginal working class and the ‘other’ category are mostly in the poorest 





Table 13.  Income decile, by class, for third classificatory scheme 
 
Income decile Class 






0 0 0 0 1 2 5 11 31 70 12 
SPC 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 12 18 10 5 
IC 1 4 5 10 14 25 34 42 36 17 19 
WE3 0 0 6 5 9 8 9 7 5 1 4 
CWC 3 7 14 26 29 36 35 26 9 1 19 
MWC 13 23 23 20 21 13 5 1 1 0 12 
TDC 83 66 52 39 26 14 6 2 0 0 29 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
A Note on the Primary Source of Income 
 
The approach used to generate Tables 11 to 13 entailed the reclassification of some 
households that had been defined in occupational terms, on the basis that income 
from certain other sources was greater than income from wages. This line of 
thinking could be extended to classify all households according to their primary or 
largest source of income, rather than classifying them according to occupation 
regardless of the importance of wages to household income. Using this approach, 
however, leads to the reclassification of very few households – because of the 
overwhelming importance of wages. Of the households defined by occupation 
according to the first two approaches used above (see Tables 7 or 10), only 3 
percent would be reclassifed as having government transfers (including the old-age 
pension) as their primary source of income and 2 percent would be reclassified 
with respect to remittances. The effects of such a reclassification on each class’s 
mean household income, share of total income or distribution in terms of income 
deciles, are consistently negligible. 
 
Unemployment and the class structure 
 
In South Africa, there is a strong relationship between inequality and 
unemployment. Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the unemployed are in the 
poorest half of the population. This is in stark contrast with people in regular 
employment, less than one quarter of whom are in the poorest half (and these are 
predominantly farmworkers and, to a lesser extent, domestic workers, not members 




relationship to income, it is clearly necessary to examine carefully how we map the 
class positions of the unemployed. In the analyses above, we have treated the 
unemployed in two ways: either (1) as members of households with mediated class 
locations according to the occupation of other household members or the source of 
household income (including especially income from business or assets), or (2) as a 
residual category. In the accompanying working paper (Seekings, 2003), we 




4. Race, Class and Geography 
 
Using the class categories set out in Table 11, we can examine the relationship 
between race and class as well as the provincial and urban/rural distribution and 
composition of the different classes. Figure 4 shows the composition of each class 
in terms of race. The first three classes (WE1, UC and WE2) are predominantly 
white, with white households comprising between 55 and 70 percent of the total in 
each class. The semi-professional, intermediate and petty trader (WE3) classes are 
predominantly African, with African households comprising between 62 and 71 
percent of the total in each. The core and marginal working classes and the residual 
‘other’ class are overwhelmingly African. There is therefore a clear relationship 
between race and class, but the relationship is far less neat or exact than it was in 
the early apartheid period. White households do not hold a monopoly of 
membership in the more privileged classes. 
 




The relationship between race and class is further exposed in Figure 5, which 
shows the class composition of the different racial groups in South Africa. The 




















percent), while the proportion of white households in them is very large (at almost 
60 percent). Conversely, the proportion of African households in the last three 
classes is very large (over 70 percent); the proportion of white households in these 
classes is small (less than 10 percent). 
 
Figure  5. Race, by class 
 
 
There is also a clear relationship between where people live and the classes they 
are in. Figure 6 shows the class composition of metropolitan, urban and rural areas 
respectively. It is not surprising that a majority of the marginal working class live 
in rural areas – as the category includes farmworkers and their dependants – but it 
is perhaps surprising that almost half of the core working class also lives in rural 
areas. The large number of teachers in rural areas means that almost half of the 
semi-professional class is also in rural areas. 
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The distribution of classes between provinces and the class composition of each of 
the provinces is much as one would expect, knowing that some provinces are 
predominantly metropolitan and others predominantly rural. WE1, UC and WE2 
together comprise 23 percent of households in the Western Cape and 31 percent in 
Gauteng. But together they comprise only 6 percent of households in the Eastern 
Cape and the Northern Province. Looked at the other way round, 52 percent of the 
upper class was in Gauteng alone, with a further 12 percent in the Western Cape. 
About half of the WE1 and WE2 classes were in these two provinces. The semi-
professional class is distributed more evenly across the provinces. The intermediate 
class, however, is also concentrated in provinces with a large metropolitan 
population. About one in four households in each of the Western Cape and 
Gauteng were in the intermediate class, and these two provinces accounted for 43 
percent of the class in South Africa as a whole. The core working class was 
concentrated in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Northwest 
Province (which between them accounted for 63 percent of the class). The largest 
concentrations of the marginal working class were in KwaZulu-Natal and 
Mpumalanga. The residual, ‘other’ class was, unsurprisingly, concentrated in the 
Eastern Cape and Northern Province, with substantial numbers of households in 
KwaZulu-Natal  as well. Between them, they accounted for about 70 percent of the 
class. In the Eastern Cape and Northern Province, more than 50 percent of 
households were in this ‘other’ class; the proportion in KwaZulu-Natal was quite a 
lot smaller, whilst in Gauteng and the Western Cape it was less than 10 percent. 
 
 
5. The Significance of Class 
 
At the outset we argued that the importance of class should not be derived from 
theory, but from observable relationship between class and other variables. Class is 
important, we suggested, if it is consequential. In this working paper we have 
sketched what the South African class structure might look like, depending on the 
assumptions made and methodology used. The paucity of data linking class to 
behavioural or attitudinal variables makes it impossible to demonstrate 
conclusively that any one approach to class is better than others, or indeed that 
class is more important than other factors (such as race or income). There are only 
a few relationships that can presently be examined with existing data. On the basis 
of this limited evidence, we suggest that there are strong relationships, but we do 
not have sufficient data to demonstrate that class is as important in South Africa as 





Incomes and Living Standards 
 
In the preceding empirical analysis of class in South Africa, we have already 
demonstrated the close relationship between class and household income. Using 
the final set of class categories, the WE1 class has a mean household income that is 
more than ten times higher than the mean household income in the core working 
class, more than twenty times higher than the mean household income in the 
marginal working class, and more than thirty times higher than the mean household 
income in the residual ‘other’ category (see Table 11).  Both mean and median 
household incomes descend steadily as one moves from WE1 to the upper class, to 
WE2, to the semi-professional class, to the intermediate class, to WE3, to the core 
and then the marginal working classes, and finally to the residual ‘other’ class. 
 
Given that household income determines – or is correlated with – many other 
variables concerning living conditions, it is unsurprising that there is also a close 
correlation between class and living conditions, and class and general levels of 
satisfaction. Table 14 presents data on selected variables for the different classes. 
Living conditions worsen from one class to another. Thus upper class households 
have an average of 6,3 rooms, and almost all have piped water and toilets inside the 
dwelling, whilst core working class households have an average of only 3,4 rooms, 
and only a minority have inside taps and toilet. The higher classes are generally 
satisfied with life; the lower classes are not. 
 
Table 14. Living conditions and satisfaction, by class 
 
Class Living in a 
house or part 




















WE1 78 6,3 73 73 62 
UC 76 6,3 90 89 67 
WE2 80 6,2 81 81 67 
SPC 76 5,2 52 51 40 
IC 63 4,2 51 48 38 
WE3 58 4,8 42 41 35 
CWC 44 3,4 31 32 29 
MWC 48 2,9 23 14 25 
Other 39 3,8 9 12 20 






The analysis in this paper so far has looked at class using the ‘snapshot’ picture of 
society provided by a one-off survey. But individuals’ and households’ class 
positions, like their incomes, can and do change over time. Mobility can take at 
least two forms. The first is mobility across the course of an individual’s life, i.e. 
‘intra-generational mobility’. Individuals can change occupations and hence their 
direct class position, or change their mediated class position through marriage or 
otherwise moving into a new household. The second is mobility between 
generations, i.e. ‘inter-generational mobility’. 
 
The study of social and occupational mobility, i.e. how people change social 
positions and occupations, is a central element in class analysis. It is not difficult to 
see why mobility is important in social and political attitudes and behaviour. As 
Erikson and Goldthorpe write: 
 
‘Most obviously, the degree of permanence or impermanence with 
which individuals are associated with different positions [i.e. in the 
social structure], and the rates and patterns of movement among them, 
may be expected to condition both the formation of identities and the 
recognition of interests and, in turn, to determine where, and with what 
degree of sharpness, lines of cultural, social, and political, as well as 
economic division are drawn. At the same time, the nature and extent of 
mobility can be expected to influence the evaluations that individuals 
make of the social order under which they live and, in particular, 
concerning the legitimacy or otherwise of the inequalities of both 
opportunity and condition that it entails. In short, mobility rates and 
patterns may be seen as a persisting and pervasive factor shaping the 
ways in which the members of a society define themselves, and in turn 
the goals they pursue and the beliefs and values that they seek to uphold 
or contest’ (1993: 2). 
 
Mobility is so important that Goldthorpe views the class structure not as a set of 
static positions, but rather as a set of career-like trajectories through positions. 
 
Almost no work has been done on mobility in South Africa. We know that the 
economy has transformed so fast that in many families, perhaps even most 
families, children are in very different occupations from their parents. It is not 
unusual for a young office-worker (in the intermediate class) to have a father who 
was a semi-skilled or skilled worker in manufacturing and/or a mother who was a 
domestic worker, and grand-parents who were farmworkers, unskilled migrant 




left their homes in the reserves (in the case of women). But we have no quantitative 
data on this mobility. 
 
This kind of mobility involves broad shifts over long periods of time. But, in South 
Africa, we know that there are also high rates of flux in individuals’ labour market 
status and, hence, earnings, and thus household incomes over short periods of time. 
What are the implications of this for our analysis of class? It is certainly possible 
that individuals often shift position in the class structure. For example, a young 
man might go to school in a rural area and live with his grandparents in a 
household where no one works. He would thus start life in a household we have 
categorised as ‘other’. He might then migrate to a town to look for work, perhaps 
living with one or both of his parents. Although unemployed himself, he would 
then have a mediated class position dependent on his working parents. If his father 
were a semi-skilled factory worker, for example, the young man would then be in 
the core working class. Suppose he finds employment as a security guard, and 
moves out of his parents’ house into a shack with a girlfriend and perhaps children 
of his own. He would then be in the intermediate class. But if he were retrenched, 
and no one in his household was employed, he would drop back into the NESU (no 
employed, some unemployed) class. If his girlfriend earned some money brewing 
beer or hawking food, they might be in the WE3 class (or even the WE2 class, if 
she was very successful). If he spends much of his life oscillating between periods 
of employment and unemployment, he might be forever shifting between classes. 
Eventually, when he retires on a government old-age pension, he is likely to return 
to the ‘other’ class in which he started out decades earlier. 
 
In societies where unemployment is low and there is little structural change in the 
economy, it is likely that individuals will shift positions infrequently and in the 
same general direction. In a society like South Africa, where unemployment is 
high, there are high rates of turnover in the labour market, household composition 
is very fluid and there have been major structural changes in the economy as a 
whole, many individuals will jump around from one class position to another and 
back again.  Combining data for Kwazulu-Natal from the 1993 PSLSD and the 
follow-up 1998 KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) allows some 
analysis of employment and income dynamics (see Cichello et al., 2001), and 
might be used to examine class dynamics also, but analysis is limited by having 
data on two moments in time only.  Other recent surveys ask more retrospective 
questions about employment history and parental occupations (e.g. the 2000 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey and the 2002 first wave of the Cape Area 
Panel Study), but these have yet to be analysed.  The Labour Force Surveys use a 
rotating panel, and in principle should allow for analysis of short-term employment 
dynamics, but the panel rotates too fast to allow analysis of change beyond a 




panel analysis.  What is needed is a longer series of data using the same panel of 
respondents, with detailed questions on employment histories between surveys. 
Until we have that data, we cannot assess the extent of flux in individuals’ 
positions within the class structure, let alone assess patterns in this flux.  The Cape 
Area Panel Study promises to do this for a panel of younger respondents (aged, at 
the outset, between 14 and 22 years-old). 
 
The Reproduction of Inequality 
 
The study of class mobility is important for another reason as well. In most 
societies, people from different class backgrounds face unequal opportunities in 
life. It is surely almost certain that the social background of individuals shapes their 
participation in the educational system, with clear effects on future earnings, and it 
is surely also plausible that social background has effects on labour market 
behaviour beyond those attributable to education alone. 
 
Most of the work done on class mobility in the advanced industrialised societies 
examines how class backgrounds affect people’s class positions in a situation 
where the overall class structure is changing slowly but steadily. The most 
important research on class mobility is that of Goldthorpe et al (1980), extending 
into Europe through the CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in 
Industrial Nations) Project (see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). These studies 
calculate absolute and relative rates of mobility. Absolute rates are the rates at 
which individuals from particular class backgrounds are mobile into other classes; 
relative rates refer to mobility rates relative to the mobility rates of individuals 
from other classes. Thus, in societies where the manual working class has been 
shrinking and the intermediate classes have been growing, there might be a high 
absolute rate of mobility from manual working class origins to intermediate class 
destinations, but a low relative rate because individuals from manual working class 
backgrounds are still much less likely to end up in the intermediate class than are 
individuals from intermediate class backgrounds. Relative mobility rates make 
allowance for changes in the overall social or occupational structure. 
 
Goldthorpe et al found that, overall, there has been trendless fluctuation in absolute 
rates, but considerable stability in relative rates. Cross-national variations were 
primarily due to the historical phasing of economic development. In the UK, the 
growth of the service class meant changing levels of absolute mobility, but little 
change in relative mobility: ‘More “room at the top” has not been accompanied by 
greater equality in the opportunities to get there’, as Marshall puts it (1997b: 5). 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) examined three cases of late industrialisation 
(Poland, Ireland and Hungary), where a majority of the labour force was engaged 




in Ireland and Poland, the decline of agricultural employment (through the break-
up of peasant agriculture) meant a sharp, more-or-less once-off increase in absolute 
mobility.  Similar work on Brazil has shown that there have been high rates of 
absolute mobility, with little change over time, whilst relative mobility rates rose 
over time – in contrast to the general pattern observed by Erikson and Goldthorpe 
(Costa-Ribeiro and Scalon, 2001). 
 
Unfortunately, we have almost no data on absolute and relative mobility rates in 
South Africa. We know that public policy during the apartheid period not only 
stunted processes of class formation among the African population as a whole 
(through racial discrimination), but also shaped the patterns of differentiation (and 
perhaps stratification) that did emerge within the African population. Both 
‘revisionist’ and ‘liberal’ writers (for examples, Hindson, 1987, and Wilson, 1975) 
emphasised the segmentation of labour markets between urban ‘insiders’ (with 
Section 10 residential rights) and migrant workers (without those rights). Schneier, 
using surveys among small samples of African workers in 1981, suggested that 
there were different inter- and intra-generational mobility rates among different 
sections of the African ‘working-class’. Urban ‘insiders’ and their children were in 
a better position to take advantage of the new opportunities opening up as a result 
of structural change in the economy and the erosion (or circumvention) of legal 
constraints (Schneier, 1983). It is likely that the social and economic changes in the 
apartheid period resulted in sharp but perhaps once-off increases in absolute 
mobility (as in Ireland and Poland), but steady rates of relative mobility. In other 
words, opportunities may have expanded for all, but remained unequal in more-or-
less steady patterns. Further research is clearly needed into this. 
 
Further research should also help in more economistic enquiries. Analysis of class 
backgrounds might help to explain some of the variance we find in occupations 
and earnings that cannot be explained in terms of education or experience. It might 
well be the case that people with identical educational qualifications have different 
prospects in the labour market today because of the different information, attitudes 
and networks that they inherited or acquired through their contrasting social 
backgrounds. The children of migrant workers might be at a permanent 
disadvantage relative to the children of urban insiders. Such inter-generational 
effects will not be visible if studies simply use racial categories. Indeed, studies 
that fail to take into account the inherited effects of class can all too easily attribute 
to ‘race’ differences in earnings that are really rooted in class. For example, Adler 
and O’Sullivan (1996) suggest that there remains a large element of racial 
discrimination in earnings, because the difference between average earnings for 
African and white workers cannot be explained in terms of education and 
experience alone. But it might well be the case that the average earnings of African 




earnings occur between these classes, and the ‘unexplained’ difference thus reflects 
not racial discrimination as much as class privilege.   
 
The growth of a well-paid African ‘middle-class’ in the 1990s (Whiteford and van 
Seventer, 2000) makes it all the more important to understand inter-generational 
factors that might affect the chances of ‘making it’ in the new South Africa. 
 
Education and the Reproduction of the Class 
Structure 
 
The PSLSD data does provide some powerful evidence that inequality is 
reproduced along class lines. Figure 7 below shows the highest school grade 
completed, on average, by children of different ages in selected classes; no 
allowance is made for post-school, or tertiary education, which would accentuate 
differences. If we take fifteen year-olds, for example, children in upper class, semi-
professional and intermediate class households have, on average, completed grade 
7. Children of the same age in core working-class households have, on average, 
completed grade 6 only, whilst children in marginal working-class households 
have only completed grade 5. By the age of nineteen, differences have widened. 
On average, children in upper class households have almost completed grade 11, 
whilst children in marginal working-class households are still some way short of 
completing grade 8. Class makes a difference of up to three grades by the age of 
nineteen. Thereafter, differences widen further as many young people in the 
marginal working-class have dropped out of school. Given the importance of 
education in determining earnings, children from marginal working class 
backgrounds are much more likely to end up in marginal working class 
occupations, and children from upper class backgrounds are much more likely to 









The relationship between class and schooling shown in Figure 7 is not dissimilar to 
the relationship between race and schooling as shown in other studies. Case and 
Deaton (1999: Figure II) show a clear relationship between race and schooling, 
with Indian and white children completing, on average, three grades more than 
African children by the age of eighteen or nineteen. Lam (1999) shows clear 
differences by race in the mean years of schooling, and the percentage of each age 
group that completed grade 7. Is it possible that the relationship posited between 
class and schooling in Figure 7 is simply a disguised reflection of the relationship 
between race and schooling? 
 
For sure, there remains a close relationship between race and class, as we saw 
above. But there are also marked differences in schooling by class even within 
racial groups. Figure 8 shows the relationship between class and schooling for 
African children only. It shows that fifteen year-old children in African upper class 
and semi-professional class households have completed at least two extra grades, 
on average, compared to children of the same age in African marginal working-
class households. By the age of nineteen, differences have widened slightly further. 






























smaller than taking all households, but there is nonetheless a very clear 
relationship: class affects education. 
 
Figure 8.  Highest school grade completed, by current age and class, 
Africa children only, 1993 
 
The most interesting difference is that, among African households, children in the 
semi-professional class have gone the furthest in school, further that is than 
children in the upper class. Having a teacher or a nurse as a parent is crucial for 
African children. 
 
The reasons why inequality is reproduced through education are not difficult to 
identify. Under apartheid, resources were allocated unequally to schools attended 
by poor and rich children (see Van der Berg, 2001, 2002). Pupil-teacher rations 
varied (although how important this is, remains unclear – see Case and Deaton, 
1999), and the quality of teachers probably varied (see Lemon and Stephens, 1999: 
223, 229). This must have some enduring effect. In schools in poor areas there 
might be no ‘culture of learning’. Poor parents spend less than richer parents on 
their children’s education (Case and Deaton, 1999), especially perhaps at the pre-
school level. They provide a less conducive home environment, and probably also 
have less positive attitudes. Within racial groups, educational achievement is also 
related to parental (especially mother’s) schooling, with the children of well-






























(Andersen et al., 2001). All of these factors are recognised by the post-apartheid 
Department of Education (Department of Education, 2000). 
 
Class, Health and Mortality 
 
In Britain and elsewhere, much of the impetus to the development of empirical 
class categories came from a concern with differential morbidity and mortality.  In 
South Africa, health statistics are generally published in racial categories alone, 
with little or no regard to the inequalities that might exist within these racial 
‘groups’.  The result is that we have very little idea as to how ‘class’, however 
defined and measured, affects health.   
 
The most comprehensive source of data on health using a representative national 
sample is the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS).  The DHS collected 
extensive data on the use of health care services, the medical history and health 
status of the respondent and other family members, the use of medicines and diet, 
smoking and other lifestyle issues.  Women were also asked about their pregnancy 
and birth history, the medical history and health of their children, and some 
questions about surviving and deceased siblings.  Anthropometric data was also 
collected from adults.  The survey allows for a close study of inequalities in health 
and access to health care services.  Unfortunately, it is very difficult to link the data 
on health to social or economic inequality, because inadequate questions were 
asked about respondents’ social and economic positions. Women were asked about 
their occupations or work, and the occupations or work of their husbands, but not 
about household income or expenditure. The survey did ask about education and 
whether the household owned assets such as a radio, washing machine and car. 
 
The published report of the DHS points to some ways in which social and 
economic inequality may be reflected in unequal health outcomes.  There is, for 
example, a clear relationship between mother’s education and infant and child 
mortality.  The probability of a child dying in the first year of life is twice as high 
for a woman with no education as for one with matric.  The probability of a child 
dying between the ages of one and five years is 1 and 5 is over eight times higher 
for a woman with standard 3 education or less than for a woman with matric.  
Infant and child mortality rates are related to living conditions and to the interval 
since the woman previously gave birth (Department of Health, 1998: 100-105).  
The incidence of tuberculosis is strongly correlated with education (ibid: 177). 
 
Booysen has done further work on the DHS using the data on ownership of durable 
goods as a proxy for wealth. He found that a very close relationship between 
wealth and access to doctors and use of contraception, and a weaker relationship 




wealth quintiles having significantly lower coverage than than the richer three 
wealth quintiles) (Booysen, 2001, 2002).  Booysen’s measure of wealth could be 
used to examine the linkage between economic position and health, but this work 
does not appear to have been done.  In addition, the occupational data might be 
amenable to examining, however crudely, the linkage between class and health.  
But, again, this work has not been done. 
 
Existing analyses of the DHS data suggest that there might be correlations between 
class, health and access to health care facilities.  But the impediments to 
constructing class categories using the DHS data make it difficult to say anything 
more.  On the other hand, the PSLSD data (and similarly data from Labour Force 
Surveys, etc) ask too few questions about health to allow much of an analysis of 
class and health.  Again, the little that can be said is suggestive. Figure 9 shows the 
proportion of respondents whose father is reported to have died, by the age of the 
respondent and the class of the respondent’s household.  This figure provides only 
a very crude proxy for mortality rates by class.  Figure 10 shows the same for 
respondent’s mothers.  In both figures, data for the WE classes has been omitted, 
but it conforms to the general pattern.  Overall, fathers and mothers are more likely 
to have died as the respondent gets older, but within each age cohort there are some 
clear differences by class.  The fathers and mothers of upper class (UC) 
respondents are less likely to have died than the fathers and mothers of respondents 






































































It must be emphasised that the parental mortality probabilities in Figures 9 and 10 
are crude proxies for mortality rates.  In practice, however, the assumptions made 
in interpreting these probabilities as a proxy for mortality almost certainly result in 
underestimating the effects of class on mortality.  First, no account is taken of the 
age at which the respondents’ parents died.  A respondent’s parents might have 
been quite elderly when the respondent was born, raising the likelihood that they 
would have died at any time thereafter.  Given that the age of first parenthood is 
probably higher for higher class individuals, this serves to reduce the difference in 
probability rates by class.  Secondly, the respondent’s current class position (or 
destination, in the language of mobility studies) might not be in the same class 
occupied by his or her father (or mother) (i.e. the class origins of the respondent).  
Given that there is an overall pattern of upward occupational mobility, because of 
the changing occupational structure, this serves to classify many lower class 
parents as members of the higher classes occupied by their children.  Again, this 
serves to reduce differences in probability rates by class.  Thirdly, many 
respondents in the PSLSD survey have a ‘mediated’ class position, with the result 
that the parent’s presumed class is in fact derived not from the child’s individual 
class position, but rather from the class of the dominant member of the child’s 
household.  Again, mediated class positions are generally raised, such that parents 
are allocated to a higher class than they should, reducing inter-class probability 
differences.  Overall, therefore, we can safely assume that the differences depicted 
in Figures 9 and 10 serve to underestimate the significance of class. 
 
Other data from the PSLSD shows little or no relationship between class and 
health.  Infant mortality rates do not seem to vary by class, which is very surprising 
given the DHS findings reported above.  Anthropometric data does not appear to 
show that higher class babies are taller or fatter than their lower class counterparts. 





This paper is intended to be exploratory.  Given the limited data available, what 
can we say about the class structure?  How do we combine an appropriate 
theoretical foundation with the empirical analysis of the effects of class so as to 
define classes in a meaningful way?  Finally, in what ways does class seem to 
count and in what ways does it not? 
 
The basic social structure of post-apartheid South Africa is apparent from each of 
the approaches used in this paper. South Africa is an overwhelmingly employment- 
and wage-dependent society, with negligible household agricultural production and 




high unemployment. Households in the richer half of the population have members 
with jobs; very many households in the poorer half of the population do not. Thus a 
majority of ‘core working class' households (as we have classified them above) are 
actually in the richer half of the population. The poorer half of the population 
comprises households dependent on very low-paid workers – mostly farmworkers 
and domestic workers – or on remittances or pensions.   
 
The analysis above can be interpreted in a range of ways as regards the positions in 
society of working class households. Looked at one way, almost the whole of 
society can be considered as ‘working class’, in very broad terms: the category 
working class could be stretched to include households classified above as 
‘intermediate class’ as well as those classified as ‘core’ or ‘marginal working 
class’, whilst households dependent on remittances could be seen as part of the 
extended working class, and those dependent on pensions as retired members of 
the same class. Only the top and bottom deciles would fall outside of the working 
class if such an elastic interpretation was used. 
 
Looked at another way, however, the working class can be defined far more 
specifically, as including just households dependent on wages from semi-skilled 
and unskilled occupations, and can be further divided into core and marginal 
working class categories. From this perspective, most households in the marginal 
working class lie below the median, whilst most of the core working class lies 
above it. The advantage of this approach is that it disaggregates wage-dependent 
households, and enables us to analyse the differences. Looked at in this way, the 
membership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) extends 
across several classes: semi-professionals (including teachers and nurses), the 
intermediate class (including office workers, skilled workers, and so on), and the 
core working class (including semi-skilled and unskilled workers). Almost all of 
these social groups lie above the median. 
 
The examination of class in this paper may be exhausting, but it is not exhaustive. 
Other possible differences between households could form the basis of important 
class divisions. For example, the division of households between those dependent 
on income from the public sector (whether pensions or earnings) and those paying 
large sums in taxation might represent an important difference, generating conflicts 
of interest over taxation and public expenditure. More importantly, we have 
presented no data on inequalities within households (by gender, age and perhaps 
other criteria). The importance and implications of intra-household inequality as 
opposed to inter-household inequality requires further study.  
 
The final section of the paper examined aspects of the significance of class.  The 




class is closely correlated with a range of other variables, including income, living 
conditions and satisfaction with life, children’s education and health, and adult 
health.  This is, of course, hardly surprising, but none of this has been explored 
adequately in the past, probably because of the understandable national obsession 
with race. 
 
There is a crying need for research in very many directions.  More recent data-sets 
(such as the Labour Force Surveys, with their much larger samples) might be 
interrogated.  More careful classifications of occupations might allow for the 
application of schema based more closely on, say, Goldthorpe’s schema.  The 
character of mediated class positions needs further analysis.  Patterns of absolute 
and relative mobility need to be explored, using data on parental occupations.  And 
the consequences of class in a wide variety of areas needs to be probed.  Much of 
this research requires that class is probed in surveys concerned with other issues, 
such as attitudes and health.  Until now, such surveys have collected very poor data 
on household class or income.  Despite the long history of Marxist analysis of and 
in South Africa, the study of class in South Africa remains in its infancy.  But, if 
more attention is paid to the inequalities of class in survey and other research, then 
we concur with Goldthorpe and Marshall’s conclusion (applied to Northern 
societies, see Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1997) that class analysis has an 





Appendix: Goldthorpe’s Class Schema 
 
Service classes 
I. Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; managers in large 
industrial establishments; large proprietors. 
II. Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher-grade 
technicians; managers in small business and industrial establishments; 
supervisors of non-manual employees. 
 
Intermediate 
III. Routine nonmanual: largely clerical; employees in administration and 
commerce; rank-and-file employees in services; this class may be divided 
into IIIa (higher grade, administration and commerce) and IIIb (lower 
grade, sales and services).  
IV. Small proprietors and self-employed artisans: this may be divided into IVa 
(small proprietors etc with employees), IVb (without employees) and IVc 
(farmers etc). 
V. Lower-grade technicians, superviors of manual workers. 
 
Working classes 
VI. Skilled manual workers. 
VII. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers: this may be divided between 
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